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One Foot Out: Young Capetonian Jews in Post-World Cup South Africa

Author: Published on: Published in: Communities & congregations

(Author: Dan Brotman, Vol. 67, No. 1, Pesach 2012)

The South African Jewish community is currently experiencing attrition through emigration, which has diminished the number of residents by close to 50% since the end of apartheid in 1994. The Cape Town Jewish community in particular has a distinct character, and thus a different outlook and relationship with the country. This paper explores the narrative of that community through historical experience, analysis of the available statistics, and qualitative interviews, in order to evaluate the outlook of young Capetonian Jews (especially regarding emigration) following the successful 2010 FIFA World Cup. This research further focuses on those between the ages of 18 and 34, whose decision to stay or leave Cape Town will most drastically impact the community’s viability.

Beginning with the destruction of the First Temple in 586 BCE, Jews have historically emigrated en masse in relatively short periods of time following an existential threat.1 Jews in South Africa have not emigrated due to one particular event or even circumstances targeting specifically Jews, but rather in response to a multitude of political, social, and economic transformations in the country. South Africanborn Australian Professor Colin Tatz of the University of New South Wales explains that “fleeing was never in question for white South Africans,” with an average gap of “two years…between decision and actual movement [for white South Africans].”2 Even in a postapartheid South Africa, young Capetonian Jews continue to weigh a variety of recent political, economic, and social developments when evaluating their options for the future. While the community as a whole is currently more optimistic than in the past several years about the country’s future, it holds onto a fear based on historical precedence that circumstances at home can deteriorate quickly, and thus one must always have an escape plan for the future.

Tatz defines an aggregate of events as “political, economic, social and psychological forces which accumulate and help build up a perception, or recognition, that it is time to think of moving, and then to act on them.”3 Unlike previous 20th Century Jewish migrations, there was no single event that spurred South African Jews to emigrate en masse. Although the community reached its peak in the early 1970s (comprising 118 200 members)4, there are today an estimated 72 000-85 000 Jews remaining in the country5, with 15 500 in Cape Town.6 Between 1981 and 2005, 40% of the community (47 000 people) left South Africa, with 38 000 departing between 1970 and 19907. The emigration of younger community members during this period resulted in the median age rising from 31.9 in 1970 to 38.9 in 1991.8

While 800,000 to 1 million whites left the country from 1996 to 2006, a whopping 40% of Jews did so during a similar period.9 After having reviewed the latest communal survey and interviewed young Capetonian Jews on whether or not they intend building their lives in South Africa, I hope to better understand why the question of “staying or leaving” is so prominent in the Capetonian Jewish psyche, and particularly among young people.

Historical Context: The Migration of Jews to South Africa

In March 1881, Tsar Alexander II of Russia was assassinated by a radical group called The People’s Will Party. As Russian Jewess Gessia Gelfman was one of those implicated in the assassination, her participation was used to justify attacking thousands of Jewish communities throughout Eastern Europe. Six weeks after the assassination, anti-Jewish pogroms targeted hundreds of Jewish communities with permission from the authorities. The May Laws were introduced the following year, which barred Jews from leaving the Pale of Settlement10 and placing other restrictions on the already impoverished population. This aggregate of events resulted in three million Eastern European Jews emigrating between 1880 and 1914; most immigrated to the United States. During this period, Jewish men who had previously immigrated to South Africa began writing home of the good conditions. Most South African Jews today are the descendants of the 40 000 mainly Lithuanian Jews who followed these veteran immigrants between 1880 and 1914.

Part I – “Past”: The History of the Emigration of Jews from South Africa

Specific post-1948 events and the subsequent political climate that followed created a gradual aggregate of events for Capetonian Jews, which resulted in many of them deciding to emigrate. In the specific case of South Africa, Tatz believes that it was a build-up of many events and factors that ultimately resulted in South African Jewish emigration throughout four specific periods, which he lists as: 1) Before the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre, 2) From Sharpeville to the 1976 Soweto Uprising, 3) periods of states of emergency and wars, and 4) the period leading up to, and since the release of Nelson Mandela.11

From Ostracized to Integrated: Before the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre

The South African Jewish community was very uncertain of its future when Daniel François Malan of the National Party defeated Jan Smuts’ United Party in the 1948 general elections. As Minister of the Interior, Malan had introduced the 1930 Quota Act, a law that put an end to Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe. Only a few months after Kristallnacht,12 he spoke in front of over 1000 people, referring to ‘parasites’ who exploited the financial markets and common people, which was code language for Jews.13 Given Malan’s previous record as Minister of the Interior, his victory caused massive panic within the Jewish community. On the eve of the 1948 general elections, historian Arthur Keppel-Jones wrote a satirical piece called When Smuts Goes, in which he predicted a major anti-Jewish pogrom (which never happened) following the National Party’s rise to power. Describing the Jewish community’s demise from a time in the future, Keppel-Jones wrote that this hypothetical pogrom deprived young Jews of career aspirations and caused mass emigration of Jewish families,14 similar to the experience of their Lithuanian ancestors.

Malan’s 1948 election victory became one of the first aggregate of events, resulting in thirteen Jewish families immigrating to Australia for ideological reasons that same year.15 These families made a conscious decision to leave South Africa due to Malan’s previous record of antisemitism and racism, which later manifested itself in his decision to strengthen and expand the Immorality Act of 1927 and seek to abolish the Cape Coloured franchise.16 Gerry Shnier and Jennifer Luntz are two separate examples of ‘liberal’ Jews who left South Africa in the early to mid-1960s due to the strengthening of apartheid. Shnier recalls feeling that, “As human beings, and particularly as Jews, we could not be residents of a country which enslaved its Coloured community.” Luntz justifies her decision to leave South Africa due to her inability “to live with my conscience in a society which granted me the opportunity to get a good school education … because I had a White skin.”17 Jews who emigrated from the late 1940s up until the early 1960s are often assumed to have been ideologically liberal, Communist or active opponents of the apartheid regime.18

Ideological-based emigration would increasingly be replaced over the next two decades by emigration spurred by concern for personal safety and the country’s future.

The build-up to the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre was characterized by the strengthening of apartheid laws and a general sense of repression. Two years after Malan’s victory, the Suppression of Communist Act was passed in an attempt to curtail any opposition to the regime. Following his resignation in 1954, Malan was replaced by Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom, who Patrick Furlong describes as a “committed antisemite” and a member of the white supremacist

Broederbond.19 It was under Strijdom that “God Save the Queen” was abolished as the co-anthem, and that District Six was destroyed under the bolstered Group Areas Act of 1950.20 Following Strijdom’s death in office in 1958, Dutch-born Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd developed a system in which black South Africans (who comprised over 80% of the country’s population) were relegated to living on some 13% of the land in reserves, where according to Verwoerd, “[they can] live and develop along their own lines”21, and ultimately would comprise of separate states.

Struggling to Take a Stand: Between Sharpeville and Soweto (1960-1975)

The Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 marked the end of the nonviolent struggle against apartheid, with black leaders looking for more effective actions against the institutionalized system of discrimination. The “black problem” was becoming a greater part of everyday conversation for ordinary white South Africans. While many African colonies were being granted independence in the 1960s, South Africa was emerging as a pariah state both regionally and globally. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan gave his famous “Winds of Change” speech to the South African parliament in 1960, in which he stated that the “winds of change” were sweeping throughout Africa, and implied that white South Africa too would eventually have to recognize and reconcile with its black majority.22 That same year, South Africa elected not to remain part of the British Commonwealth and become a Republic, which led to white South Africans losing their status to freely immigrate to British Commonwealth countries.23 White South Africans were beginning to feel the negative implications of living under the apartheid system, but little knew that the situation at home would become a lot more uncomfortable for all races over the next decade. Crisis and Growing Dissent: 1976-1985

The Soweto Uprising in June 1976 resulted in 176 deaths and, unlike the Sharpeville Massacre, was aired live on television, which had recently been introduced to South Africa. Steve Biko’s death in 1977 (at the hands of the Bureau of State Security) fueled international outrage, but Biko’s legacy in the Black Consciousness Movement continued to instill pride among black South Africans in their language and culture.24 1983 proved just as bad as 1976, with 469 industrial strikes, inflation rising to record levels, and 450 names on the ‘banned’ list. Afrikaner extremism was on the rise, with Eugène Terre’Blanche and his Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging supporters parading openly in uniform.25 Tatz describes the typical white emigrant of this decade as “appalled or frightened by the Soweto uprising and police massacres.”26

The Beginning of the End: 1986-1990

Despite international sanctions, apartheid South Africa was able to stay afloat into the 1980s partially due to the insistence of US President Ronald Reagan’s policy of “constructive engagement” with the regime of Pieter Willem Botha. Capetonian emigrant Gillian Heller says, “The mid-80s was a time of great political instability in South Africa. Because of embargoes on news reporting from the townships, we knew little of the truth of what was going on, but one certainty was that life as we knew it in apartheid South Africa was going to change. The big fear was that the transition to a new status quo would be a bloodbath … this is the reason why I emigrated.” 27

A state of emergency was declared in 35 districts in July 1985, and at any one time South Africa had 20 000 troops in active military duty throughout South Africa, Southwest Africa (Namibia), Angola, Lesotho, and Botswana. That same year, private businessmen began meeting with the ANC leadership outside of South Africa, as a general consensus began to emerge among whites that negotiations with the ANC were necessary. Tatz reports that during this period, “leaving South Africa was now becoming much more thinkable, and viable. A cross-over point had been reached – the one at which the individual who could once say ‘none of this affects me’ was now able to admit that a great deal of all this was affecting him or her.”28 The main catalysts to emigrate during this period were the states of emergency, growing urban guerrilla warfare, and increasing crime.29

In 1990, de Klerk announced that he would release Nelson Mandela, suspend the death penalty, and unban the ANC and other opposition parties. South Africa was on the brink of change,30 and black majority rule was now imminent. Tatz describes the period leading up to black majority rule and the black-on-black violence prior to the 1994 elections as leading to rapid emigration by white South Africans, as “most people could not believe that the non-violent transfer of power could stay non-violent.”31 As one 1989 Jewish emigrant explained: “The political, rule of law and financial future situation there appeared to be heading in the wrong direction.”32 Regardless of which side of the fence Jews were in respect to apartheid, the period from 1986-1990 was filled with uncertainty over imminent change.

With the demise of apartheid, Jews continued to leave South Africa in droves. Although now democratic, a new black government and soaring crime rates (particularly in Johannesburg) created a new set of concerns for those who did not leave during the turbulent apartheid years, and led to further emigration from the Mandela years to the present.

Cohesion and Insularity: 1990-Present

Lack of personal safety became a major catalyst for emigration beginning in the late 1980s, with crime rates eventually peaking in 1999 and 2000. Only three years following the first democratic elections in 1994, Interpol reported that South Africa had the highest per capita rates of murder and rape in the world,33 and in 2001 the BBC reported that “South Africa is the most dangerous country in the world which is not at war.”34 1999 emigrant Merle Finkel left because of “crime, violence, and I saw no long-term future. There was great disappointment with the attitude of the new government in fulfilling their promises.”35 Tatz describes crime as the prime motivator for Jewish emigration in the post-2000 era, which created an unbearable situation for some whites who had previously been accustomed to living in apartheid-era safety.36

Between 2000 and 2008, 44% of Jewish emigrants chose Australia, 18% the US, 12% Israel, and 9% Canada. One recent emigrant commented on her choice to move to Australia: “If these problems are realistically addressed [under the current leadership of President Jacob Zuma], I would not rule out the possibility of coming back. However … as a young family, we see ourselves as going to a first world country with a low crime rate, a similar climate and the important factor of a big Jewish community in Australia.”37

As the 2005 Kaplan Survey (see Part II) was conducted before some of the country’s more recent changes (i.e., the election of Jacob Zuma, the Democratic Alliance taking control of the Western Cape, the global recession/stronger Rand, the World Cup, and the rising prominence of ANC Youth League President Julius Malema), my interviews with young Capetonian Jews highlight some of the latest developments in the country that were not addressed in that Survey. I believe that these more recent events are vitally important and frequently discussed among 18-34 year old Jews, who ponder whether or not to stay in South Africa. If the majority of this age group decides to stay in the country, they will emerge as some of the future leaders of the Jewish community and of their nation. If most of them choose to leave, the community’s future viability will be seriously compromised.

Part II – “Present”: Findings from the 2005 Kaplan Survey

In 2005, a nationwide survey was conducted of the South African Jewish community by the University of Cape Town’s Isaac and Jessie Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies and Research. It was based on 1000 face-to-face interviews throughout the nation, and was divided proportionately according to where the Jewish community currently resides. With the second largest Jewish community in South Africa and about one-quarter of the Jewish community, Cape Town provided 250 respondents.38 The purpose of the survey was to check on the community’s attitude-needs-and behavior-barometer, in order to better understand the current trends in a community that is undergoing demographic change due to low birth rates and emigration. Of the 250 respondents in Cape Town, 46% were male, and 54% female. I focused on the responses of 18-34 year-olds, who comprise of 27% of the total respondents.39

An Educated and Professional Community

1993 emigrant Doreen Wainer explained her decision to emigrate due to her sense that the “academic education standards would decline in the public school system.”40 Regardless of whether or not Wainer’s concerns about the public school system came true, the survey shows that the average level of education among South African Jews has in fact increased since the 1998 survey, with 91% of Jews now holding a high school matriculation certificate. 64% of Jews have obtained post-high school education, up from 56% in 1998. While only 32% had university qualifications in 1998, this had risen to 36% in 2005, with 56% of those holding a university degree having graduated with honors or above.41 The high level of education among South African Jews most likely gives the younger members the relative flexibility to succeed in their own country or to emigrate, making the question of migration extremely relevant among this group.

It is also noteworthy that Jews are becoming increasingly well-educated during an era in which South Africa is struggling to educate all of its citizens. Despite common complaints that government-supported Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)42 limits academic and professional opportunities for whites, Jews are obtaining degrees of higher education at astounding rates. One question I explored during my interviews was whether Jews pursued education more strongly, especially higher education, due the restrictions of BEE in terms of entrance requirements to university. Alternatively, the fact that the vast majority of Jews attend exclusive private Jewish high schools means that they are probably better prepared than most South Africans to enter and excel in the higher education system, which has very little to do with BEE.

Employment rates among Jews have remained consistently high from 1998-2005 compared to South Africa at large, with seven in ten Jews engaged in paid employment, and five in seven of those are engaged in full-time employment.43 Once again, it is curious as to how the Jewish community has weathered the economic changes in the country over the past 16 years. They may have maintained high levels of employment due to their high level of education, the motivation to work harder despite the restrictions of BEE, and/or the practice of Jews hiring other Jews. Lastly, young Jews may be motivated to obtain a higher education due to cultural reasons, with some pursuing higher education in order to one day be able to leave the country permanently or compete for a job in an era where non-white South Africans officially get job preference. These questions I will consider in Part III.

Staying versus Leaving

Of the 92% of respondents who characterize themselves as likely to remain in South Africa over the next five years (the highest recorded preponderance of Jews ever wanting to stay in the country), they were asked to give their top three top reasons for wanting to stay. Of all reasons given, 90% mentioned financial/business/career factors, 86% mentioned an emotional attachment to the country, and 69% mentioned staying close to family. Although I was surprised that family unification was not given as the top reason for staying, it is possible that the dispersal of South African Jewish families around the globe now means that staying no longer automatically guarantees family unification. Alternatively, the relative ease with which South African Jews can now travel (as opposed to during the apartheid years) to visit loved ones may mean that family unification is less of determining factor as to in which country one chooses to reside.44 Researchers observed that there was a heavier emphasis in 2005 on “positive” reasons for staying (i.e. “emotional attachment to South Africa”) over the many negative factors mentioned in 1998 (i.e. “too hard to start over elsewhere”).45

When this same group of 92% respondents who plan to stay in South Africa over the next five years were asked what would make them feel that they no longer want to live in the country, a remarkable 97% cited crime/personal safety concerns/militancy/anarchy/ corruption, 68% cited a change in quality of life, 64% cited issues relating to Jews (i.e. antisemitism and anti-Zionism), 55% cited career/financial/ business/ economy, and 38% cited family/friends/ relationship issues.46 It is difficult to explain why 90% of respondents mentioned career/financial/ business/economy as a reason for staying, while a mere 55% mentioned that a deterioration in this category would cause them to consider leaving.47 It is noteworthy that only 15% would consider leaving if the economic situation deteriorated, 8% if affirmative action became too restrictive, 6% if Zimbabwe-like hostilities were unleashed against whites, and 1% if corruption increased.48 The survey indicates overwhelmingly that Jews choose to remain in the country due to perceived career opportunities, an emotional attachment to the country, and family reasons, while a major deterioration in the level of personal safety or quality of life would cause them to leave. My interviews in Part III confirm the survey’s findings on questions of staying versus leaving.

While only 7% of respondents indicated they were fairly (4%) or very likely (3%) to leave in the next five years, the top reasons mentioned by over 20% of those likely to emigrate in the next five years are (in order of prevalence) due to personal safety concerns, reunification with family overseas, worries about the future, and the advancement of their careers. These numbers have changed since 1998, when 79% of those likely to emigrate mentioned crime, whereas it dropped to 54% in 2005.49 90% of respondents in 1998 rated the level of personal safety in the country as ‘poor’, while in 2005 that dropped to 60%,50 meaning that although personal safety is still a primary motivator for emigration, South African Jews also see the level of personal safety as improving. This may explain why only 71% planned on staying in the country in 1998, versus 92% in 2005.51 However, the survey did not ask if Jews have been investing more money over the past few years hiring private security companies or fortifying their homes, as this could have a major impact on their sense of security, even if in reality the safety situation has deteriorated.

When respondents were asked to list the top three countries which they would consider emigrating to (if they had to leave), Australia received the most mentions (61%), followed by the US (55%), Israel (51%), UK (38%), Canada (18%) and New Zealand (8%). While the rankings for 25-34 year olds are comparable to those of their older counterparts, only 18-24 year-olds indicated a top preference for the US and UK, followed by Australia and then Israel.52

Part III – “Future”: Four Interviews with Young Capetonian Jews

Although the 2005 Kaplan Survey presents many noteworthy statistics, the mere fact that is it a broad national survey means it does not offer a platform for Capetonian Jews to tell their personal narratives, which most certainly play a role in the way in which they answered the questions. In Part III, I have selected four young Capetonian Jews under the age of 34, each of whom brings a unique perspective and outlook to questions regarding the emigration of Capetonian Jewish young adults. While some of the interviews I conducted substantiated my assumptions regarding the behaviour and though processes of young Capetonian Jews, some of their statements raise compelling questions, with implications that suggest directors for further inquiry.

Although South African by birth, Ryan and Dean Solomon53 (aged 25 and 22) only arrived in Cape Town in 2004, having been raised by their Zimbabwean-born parents in Bulawayo. Their parents left for Johannesburg in the late 1970s, and it was here that Ryan, Dean, and their older brother Craig were born. After starting a business from scratch proved to be too difficult, their parents brought the boys back to Zimbabwe, where their father joined the family business. Transnational migration is therefore not new to the brothers, all three of whom currently live in Cape Town, though their parents remain in Bulawayo. While their father’s brother and sister live in Cape Town, their mother’s brother and parents live in Australia. The dispersal of Ryan and Dean’s extended family is universal in the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean Jewish community, which at its peak had about 7000 members in the 1970s54, and which today numbers little more than 250.55

Aside from having relocated to South Africa as young adults, Ryan and Dean offer a unique perspective as Zimbabweans. They more consciously look for warning signs of trouble, as they have previously witnessed the deterioration of the economy, government, and services in their homeland. When asked if they see signs that South Africa might face a similar fate, Ryan expresses concern over the invasions of white farms, although it was “on no scale near to what happened in Zimbabwe, and I do not think it will be. There is too much foreign investment here.” Dean reminds Ryan in the interview that Zimbabwe was once “the highest ranked country in Africa … [but] it takes one shmuck to stand on top and say ‘this is how it’s going to work’, and completely screw everything over.” Ryan believes that the multi-party system in South Africa56 will prevent it from ever becoming a Zimbabwe-like dictatorship. Although Ryan appears to be more confident than Dean that South Africa is not heading down a path towards chaos, Dean cites recent local power cuts and food shortages as similar to the early signs of national crisis experienced in Zimbabwe.

When the situation in Zimbabwe drastically deteriorated in 2000, Ryan and Dean’s parents applied to immigrate to Australia, but eventually decided against it due to the difficulty of starting over. Their decision was based on the perception of Australia as a ‘utopia’ (in Ryan’s words), due to a similar climate and lifestyle, and a relatively low crime rate. Dean cites the fact of their mother’s family already being in Australia as a reason for why it was their parents’ first-choice destination. Although their older brother was admitted to a university in Perth, he relocated to Cape Town instead when he realized that his parents were not going to leave Zimbabwe. Ryan came to Cape Town to commence his marketing degree, while Dean chose to complete high school at a Durban boarding school. Neither brother saw his decision to come to South Africa as being permanent, but rather as a necessary step to furthering his education. While Ryan did not choose to study marketing for any particular reason relating to emigration, Dean says that he chose chartered accountancy because in high school, “they tell you what the most sought-after jobs are. And accountants are in the top ten.” He adds that if accounting had not been desirable abroad, he would have chosen to study another subject.

After his experience of living under Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, Dean was extremely concerned when Jacob Zuma became President in 2009. However, when reflecting on Zuma’s presidency after its first year, he expresses relief: “He [Zuma] has not done that much now as a president, but he has not done anything wrong. The guy had rape allegations against him, he is a polygamist… all these things are negative signs against him…someone you do not want  to be running your country…and then you look at [then ANC Youth League President] Julius Malema.” Ryan is proud of the current economic stability in South Africa, but believes that there will be no future for foreign investment if someone like Malema became president.

Together with their mother and older brother, Ryan and Dean began the process five years ago of applying for Polish citizenship, as their maternal grandfather was born in Poland. Both agree that this decision to obtain a European Union passport was to provide an option to leave (i.e. an “escape plan”) should this ever be required. Although they could legally migrate tomorrow to Britain (as European Union citizens) or Israel (as Jews), or even to rejoin their parents in Zimbabwe, the brothers are committed to building a future in Cape Town. Says Ryan, “I like Africa. I have seen life in America, London … it is not the same as here.” However, both would leave the country if living in Cape Town was no longer possible. Dean explains: “I would not move anywhere [else] in South Africa. I do not enjoy the lifestyle in Johannesburg behind closed doors, [and it is] polluted. I hate the feeling of being in Johannesburg. Paranoia. Durban I have lived in, and did not enjoy it. And after living in Cape Town, I cannot go back to living in a small town”.

Although the brothers related instances of violent crime against family members, such as Ryan being robbed at gunpoint, and their aunt being beaten over the head during an armed robbery, both express a commitment to staying as long as the current situation does not change drastically. They express a love for living in their corner of Africa, and although now possessing European passports, intend to build their long-term futures in the Mother City.

Kelly Berzack57, a 34 year-old self-employed masseuse and silversmith, is a first-generation Capetonian and second-generation South African, her parents having been born in Johannesburg and her grandparents in England and Lithuania. Of the three children in her family, she and her older brother live in Cape Town while her older sister has lived out of South Africa for more than 20 years and currently resides in New York.

Explaining why her sister left, Kelly says “because she wanted an overseas education, and did not want to live in this country, ever.” Kelly has a large extended family of South African origin in the United States (her father’s brothers live in Atlanta and Los Angeles). Her perspective on migration and the South African situation is unique in that she belongs to the last generation to have grown up under apartheid (she matriculated in 1995) and thus witnessed first-hand the transition to democracy and subsequent rise in crime. She only recently moved back to Cape Town after a two-year stint in Israel, to where she immigrated in 2008 to marry her Israeli-born husband. She belongs to the roughly 8% of South African Jews who have previously emigrated and returned, and thus her choice to remain here is a conscious and careful decision.58

Like Ryan and Dean, Kelly lives in Sea Point, which is locally known as ‘the’ Jewish neighbourhood in Cape Town.59 She describes her childhood as peaceful and safe, and only remembers crime becoming an issue after the 1994 elections. Of her Sea Point childhood, she recalls: “It was blissful. I remember as a youngster walking Sea Point Main Road, or rollerblading at eleven o’clock at night. You could walk on the sea promenade at night without a care in the world. From about 1997-98, you began hearing stories about what was going on – people getting mugged, and so on”.

One of the biggest changes to affect Kelly’s life was the influx of street people to her neighborhood. “It affects my life every day, as they live on my street. It is uncomfortable, it is noisy, and it stinks. They use the street as a toilet….Sea Point became like that in 1999 or 2000. They just came in from nowhere, and settled themselves.” Kelly believes that the government should create kibbutz-like farm and factory jobs to get the poor off the streets, where many of them live. Prior to immigrating to Israel, she hired a private security company to patrol her street and escort her to her front door when she returned home at night. She has little faith in the local police, whom she believes are more intent on clamping down on law-abiding civilians than on potential criminals.

Violent crime has affected both Kelly’s family and friends. Five of the latter have been held up at gunpoint and/or have been mugged while driving, and a gun was held to her stepmother’s head during a break-in. Despite this, neither she nor her friends or immediate family want to leave the country. On the current safety situation in Sea Point, she says, “Personally, I worry that I may be naïve, but I feel that it is safer. I do not know how much it has to do with the FIFA World Cup, but it definitely feels like it has improved.”

Although Kelly believes that South Africa is at a junction from where it can either succeed or fail, she chooses to believe that it will succeed. As she does not currently have children, she feels under less pressure to worry about the future. She believes that most white South Africans are uncertain about the future, but for herself does not see South Africa becoming another Zimbabwe. She would rather move overseas than to another city in South Africa, as she is happiest when living in Cape Town: “I am who I want to be when I am here.…I like the people, I like the views, I like the way we live — [the] cosmopolitan lifestyle. There is something for everyone here”.

Larry Hartmann60 is a 29 year-old Cape Town-born fashion designer. Both his late father and mother are natives of Cape Town, but his grandparents arrived in South Africa as children from Germany and Lithuania. Larry’s mother belongs to the 43% of South African Jewish parents whose children over the age of 22 all live in South Africa, as Larry and his older brother both live in Cape Town.61 Typical of a South African Jewish family, his relatives are dispersed all over the world: His aunt lives in Switzerland, and he has five first cousins in the US and Israel. Unlike Dean, Ryan, and Kelly, Larry holds only South African citizenship. Having been raised by a single mother, he comes from a less privileged background relative to the rest of the Jewish community, and began working seven days a week at a pharmacy at the age of 16. He has not yet been overseas.

Unlike Ryan, Dean, and Kelly, only Larry has friends who have both been positively and negatively impacted by Black Economic Empowerment (BEE):

I have a black friend who is a designer. To her credit, she is incredibly talented and good at what she does, so it is not like she gets by on being black. However, it is certainly easier for her to get a job than my white friends who are designers. I think that in concept it [BEE] is a good idea and is important for the previously disadvantaged community, the black community. If you did not have BEE, white people would have all the good jobs, and blacks would stay where they are.

Although Larry says that he has not personally been very affected by BEE due to his field (“I am not in a corporate industry, where it is so prevalent”), he tells of how he will never apply to work at his dream company due to his skin colour:

I would not even bother applying, because I know when we were studying at Tech, all the retailers would approach our college and ask for our student portfolios, and this company in particular would only ask for the black students’ portfolios, and not even look at the white students’ portfolios … which is why the lecturers would not give them anything … They said, ‘If you are not willing to look at all of our students, you are not going to look at any of them.’

Like Ryan and Kelly, but unlike Dean, Larry never considered choosing a career based on the possibility of taking it out of South Africa. He agrees with all three that a higher education was not necessary during apartheid for Jews to procure employment, and says that “now you need to be a little better than everyone else because there is BEE, and because the marketplace is more saturated.” Although Larry was not hired at his first fashion job due to a Jewish connection, he believes that young Jews are often hired by other Jews due to a sense of familiarity:

Jewish people have a reputation for being hard workers and for being successful. When I think about the Jewish people I know, and the jobs they are in (a lot of them are in property), they are in the same companies owned by Jews, or they are in finance, and are in the financial companies owned or run by Jews.

Most of Larry’s good childhood friends have left South Africa, with the vast majority having immigrated to Israel for a “sense of community” and others going to the US, Dubai and Australia. He believes that they were not actively pushed out of South Africa, but rather “left for better opportunities”. He adds that when they do visit, they are “in awe of Cape Town, and love it”, but nevertheless did not wish to live there.

Larry was attacked and injured in a mugging, and his best friend’s father was murdered in a robbery. Despite these traumatic events, he intends building his life in Cape Town. He is optimistic about the strengthening Rand, which he believes was partially the result of the 2010 World Cup. He mentions Wal-Mart’s interest in opening stores in South Africa as an indicator of a bright economic future, and does not see the crime situation as deteriorating. Larry feels relief knowing that he could easily leave the country tomorrow for Israel should the situation in South Africa become unbearable. As to why he chooses to remain in Cape Town, he answers: “Because it is home. I love Cape Town. I do not love South Africa.”

Conclusions

History has shown that when South African Jews sense a perceived catastrophic change about to take place in the country, a great many leave in droves. Jews have always been uneasy with their role in South Africa, whether it is through being seen as a barrier to Afrikaner success, accomplices or enemies of the apartheid system, or a minority ruled by a black majority government. The 2005 Kaplan Survey and interviews I conducted confirm a growing sense of cautious optimism among young Capetonian Jews. I observe that in the year 2010, there has been a growing sense of optimism among them as the result of a successful World Cup, a stronger Rand, the opposition party’s takeover of the Western Cape, and a stable Zuma presidency. However, the rise of Julius Malema and the uncertainty over the future implementation of BEE were mentioned as serious causes for concern, and possibly (though not unanimously) warning signs that the country will become “another Zimbabwe”.

Despite common complaints over BEE, young Jews appear to be weathering the perceived difficulty for whites to gain employment by obtaining higher levels of education and seeking employment from other Jews. It would be interesting to see data on whether the general white population also became more educated in the years 1998-2005, and if so, whether BEE serves as a motivator for young whites to pursue a higher education. An alternative explanation may be that the saturation of the job market in the post-apartheid era now means that all South Africans with professional aspirations (regardless of color) must pursue a higher education, and thus this would be neither a uniquely Jewish nor white phenomenon.

It is noteworthy that talking of and actually leaving South Africa appears more prevalent among the 25-34 year-olds, such as Kelly’s friends, who are split on whether or not to remain, and Larry’s friends, of whom have already left. The younger Ryan and Dean say that the majority of young people in their social circle do not discuss leaving. While it is possible that their friends do not discuss doing so because they are still studying and are only now launching their careers, it is also possible that because this younger generation grew up entirely in post-apartheid South Africa, they are less compelled to leave because they never experienced the shock of the transition to black majority rule and general escalation in crime. One common denominator that both the 18-24 and 25-34 year-olds share is constantly thinking about hypothetical “escape plans”, whether it be applying for foreign citizenship or reassuring oneself that Israel offers open immigration to all Jews. The 2005 Kaplan Survey and all the interviewees indicate that young Cape Town Jews are more focused on the future of the city rather than that of the country, as any future migration would be transnational rather than to another South African city.

Young Capetonian Jews will most likely remain in South Africa for the foreseeable future, as there are many positive signs that both the city and country are heading in a positive direction. However, history has shown that sudden political instability can contribute so heavily to a South African Jew’s aggregate of events, that the benefits of staying in South Africa, and more specifically in Cape Town, are overshadowed by fears for the future, and thus lead to emigration. I predict that if the Democratic Alliance becomes stronger both provincially and nationally, the more confident young Jews will be that they have a future in the country, even if their political involvement is limited to voting. While young Capetonian Jews are not necessarily leaving due to crime per se, they will not stay if they believe they are living in a “sinking ship”, as the Solomon family realized in Zimbabwe.

The Capetonian and South African Jewish narrative is the quintessential story of migration. Just as their European ancestors emigrated due to an aggregate of events that included professional restrictions on Jews and widespread government-sponsored pogroms, so was the Jewish reality in South Africa marred with extreme fear for the future which culminated in another aggregate of events that led almost half of them to leave for more politically stable countries. This migration has created transnational networks of Capetonian Jews living at home and abroad, and is being maintained through online communities, class reunions, and more accessible international travel in a new South Africa embraced by the world.

Although the majority of South African Jewish emigrants do not return permanently to their land of birth, my interviews indicate that a more fluid outlook on migration is being created in the 21st Century among Capetonian Jews, in which dual citizenship and personal links abroad make two-way transnational migration far less challenging than before. While it is only safe to assume that Capetonian Jews will continue to leave and return to the Mother City in flux, the implications of the events of 2010 both at home and abroad may result in a greater number of them choosing to build their lives at home, due to post-World Cup cautious optimism and the country’s relatively stable economic situation. As long as young Jews feel that there is political stability and promising economic opportunities in Cape Town, but at the same time know that they can leave should the country head in the direction of neighboring Zimbabwe, they will remain for the foreseeable future, living in cautious optimism, albeit with one foot in and one out.

Dan Brotman is Media and Diplomatic Liaison officer at the Cape Council at the SA Jewish Board of Deputies. He holds a BA (Honors) in International Relations from the University of Oregon, and is a regular contributor to local and international publications on issues relating to South African Jewry.

Notes

  1. Colin Tatz, Worlds Apart: The Re-migration of South African Jews (New South Wales: Rosenberg Publishing Pty Ltd, 2007), 14.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Tatz, 163.
  4. Richard Mendelsohn and Milton Shain, The Jews in South Africa (Jeppestown: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2008), 149
  5. Mendelsohn and Shain, 214.
  6. Herzlia Alumni Association, “Alumni Chairman’s Message.” <http://www.herzlia.com/content/?ContentID=acbb20b8-ca77-4356-8b09-a2c9e7e17ee7&Section=3>(accessed 2 November, 2010)
  7. Note that this period is before the end of apartheid
  8. Mendelsohn and Shain, 183.
  9. Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, 2006, 93: Quoted in Tatz, 38.
  10. A region to which most Jews in the Russian Empire were restricted to living prior to the 1917 revolution
  11. Ibid., 162.
  12. The November 1938 government-sponsored pogrom in Nazi Germany and Austria, in which thousands of synagogues and Jewish business were destroyed, 91 Jews killed and 30 000 Jewish men detained.
  13. Patrick J. Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1991), 51,54.
  14. Gideon Shimoni. Community and Conscience: The Jews of Apartheid South Africa (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2003), 21.
  15. Tatz, 165.
  16. Ibid.
  17. Ibid., 171
  18. Ibid., 185.
  19. Ibid., 166.
  20. Ibid.
  21. Ibid., 168.
  22. Ibid., 169
  23. Ibid., 171
  24. Tatz, 174.
  25. Tatz, 176.
  26. Tatz, 185.
  27. Ibid., 46.
  28. Ibid., 177.
  29. Ibid., 185.
  30. Ibid., 177-180.
  31. Ibid., 182.
  32. Quoted in Tatz., 180.
  33. Schonteich and Louw, 4: Quoted in Tatz., 198.
  34. BBC News, 16 April 2002: Quoted in Tatz., 198.
  35. Quoted in Tatz, 199.
  36. Tatz, 184.
  37. Belling, Suzanne. A new wave of South African emigration. JTA. October 23, 2008.
  38. Mendelsohn and Shain, 181.
  39. Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies and Research at the University of Cape Town (Kaplan Survey). The Jews of South Africa 2005 – Report on a Research Study (Shirley Bruk Research, May 2006) , 1-9
  40. Tatz, 182.
  41. Kaplan Survey, 11.
  42. The South African government defines BEE as “an integrated and coherent socio-economic process that directly contributes to the economic transformation of South Africa and brings about significant increases in the numbers of black people that manage, own and control the country’s economy, as well as significant decreases in income inequalities.” See http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=70187
  43. Kaplan Survey, 237.
  44. Ibid., 97.
  45. Ibid., 99.
  46. Ibid., 101.
  47. Ibid.
  48. Ibid.
  49. Ibid., 105.
  50. Ibid., 64.
  51. Ibid., 91.
  52. Ibid., 88-89.
  53. Ryan and Dean Solomon, interview on 03/10/2010.
  54. Tatz, 38.
  55. The brothers visited Bulawayo one week prior to the interview for their mother’s birthday. They tell of both optimism and despair in Zimbabwe, with new government restrictions making it very difficult for their father to run his supermarket, while at the same time young expats (such as their first cousin) have returned to the country for economic opportunities.
  56. The Democratic Alliance took control of the Western Cape in 2009. This is the first time that a non-ANC political party has taken control of a province since the 1994 elections.
  57. Kelly Berzack, interview on 04/10/10.
  58. Kaplan, 75.
  59. 41% of Cape Town respondents in the 2005 Kaplan Survey live in the Sea Point area. See Kaplan, 8.
  60. Larry Hartmann, interview on 04/10/10.
  61. Kaplan, 16.

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