Jewish Affairs

SOUTH AFRICAN JEWISH EMIGRATION: THE WHAT, THE WHERE AND THE WHY

(Author: Reviva Hasson, Vol. 80, #1, Autumn 2025)

 

South Africa’s Jewish population has been steadily declining for decades. From a peak of close to 120,000 in the 1970s, the community has more than halved in size. By 2019, there were just over 52,000 Jews living in the country, constituting about 0.09% of the national population. While some decline can be explained by low birth rates and assimilation, the overwhelming driver has been emigration, with relatively few new arrivals to offset the losses.

The Jewish community’s emigration is embedded within the broader South African trend of, mostly skilled labour, emigration. Data collected by the UN for example, indicate that there are over a million South African born individuals living abroad.[1]  During the apartheid era emigration was generally motivated by a mixture of fear of civil war, discomfort with the apartheid system and anxiety regarding how the transition of power would unfold.[2]  However, in the post-1994 democratic era, the emigration trend has continued and has become an entrenched feature of contemporary South African Jewish life, such that three in five Jewish South Africans have close family members living abroad.[3]

By bringing together administrative migration data and three national surveys of the South African Jewish population we map the main trends in Jewish emigration since the end of apartheid. Although the surveys have some differences in method and design, all include questions on migration and shed light on changing attitudes over time. The 1998 and 2005 surveys are quite similar each involving 1000 face-to-face interviews with Jewish adults living in the four main cities in South Africa.[4] The most recent survey, the 2019 Jewish Community Survey of South Africa (JCSSA) was conducted online and gathered responses from 4192 Jewish adults from across the country, offering a particularly detailed view of who is leaving, where they are going, and why.[5]

Where Are South African Jews Going?

Understanding where Jewish South Africans have gone — and where they expect to go — requires drawing on both governmental records from censuses and Jewish community survey data. Together, these sources reveal not only the size and distribution of the South African Jewish diaspora but also how emigration patterns have shifted.

We estimate that there are about 60 000 South African-born Jews now living abroad — more than the 52 300 Jews currently living in South Africa (Table 1).

Table 1. Estimate of the Size of South Africa’s Jewish Diaspora [8]

Like most South African emigrants (Figure 1), the overwhelming majority have settled in English-speaking democracies: the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States and Canada. One country, however, stands apart: Israel. While not a top destination for South African emigrants generally, it accounts for over a quarter of all Jewish emigrants from South Africa — a significant divergence from the general South African pattern. [9]

Figure 1. Location of South Africans living abroad [10]

Detailed South African Jewish migration statistics from Israel, Australia, and the UK (Figure 2) show that the trend fluctuates over time with periods of increased emigration in 2007-2008 and again from 2015-2021, while emigration reaches its low point in 2004-2005 and again from 2012-2014.

Notably, the dominant destination has changed: prior to 2010, Australia was the most popular choice; but from 2015 onward, Israel became the leading destination for South African Jewish emigrants. In 2001, for every South African Jew moving to Israel, four moved to Australia. Twenty years later, in 2022 the ratio had reversed: for every one person going to Australia, three went to Israel.

Figure 2. Migration of South African Jews to Israel, Australia, and England and Wales 2001–2022. [11]

We observe the same shift in the community survey data. In the 1998 and 2005 community surveys, Australia and the United States were the top destinations among those considering emigration, making up more than half of the responses (Figure 3). By contrast, in 2019, 51% of respondents said they would go to Israel. The United States and Australia combined accounted for significantly less at 22%.

Figure 3. Preferred Destination Country by time period.[12]

An in-depth examination of the 2019 survey data shows that the trend of Israel emerging as the primary destination was evident across almost all demographic subgroups, regardless of age, income, or location (Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6).[13]

Figure 4. Preferred destination country by age group (JCSSA, 2019)
Figure 5. Preferred Destination Country by Financial Wellbeing (JCSSA, 2019)
Figure 6. Preferred Destination country by Place of Residence (JCSSA, 2019) [14]

Interestingly religious identity is found to play a strong role in shaping destination preferences (see Figure 7). More religious Orthodox respondents—particularly those identifying as Haredi, Chassidic, or Strictly Orthodox—were much more likely to choose Israel compared to their Secular or Cultural Jewish counterparts. In contrast, Secular/Cultural Jews showed a stronger preference for emigration to the United Kingdom.

Figure 7. Preferred destination country by Jewish identity strand (JCSSA, 2019) [15]

Most countries’ immigration policies tend to favour younger individuals and those with greater financial means. It is therefore not surprising that a relatively high proportion of older and less affluent individuals choose Israel (Figure 4 and Figure 5), suggesting that for those who wish to leave South Africa but lack broader options, Israel may be the only viable destination. At the same time, it is evident that a significant share of younger and more affluent Jewish South Africans identifies Israel as their preferred destination, indicating that for many, Israel holds intrinsic appeal—a destination of choice rather than one of last resort.

Who’s Most Likely to Leave?

The surveys asked respondents how likely they were to leave South Africa. The bars displayed in Figure 8 indicate the percentage of the population that answered they were likely or very likely to leave within the next five years, and while not indicative of actual emigrants, capture the emigration sentiment at a particular time. In order to give a sense of the broader context in which these surveys were conducted; our findings are superimposed upon the South African GDP growth rate with additional information showing the presidencies and major global events.

Figure 8. Emigration Sentiment (black columns) and GDP Growth rate (light grey line) [16]

We observe that in 1998, a time of declining growth, political transition, rising crime and, following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, instability throughout the developing world, emigration sentiment was at its highest – with 27% of survey respondents saying they were likely to emigrate. In stark contrast just seven years later, emigration sentiment dropped to a low of 7%. 2005 was a golden time in the new South Africa, having just passed a third peaceful election cycle South Africa was characterized by political stability, economic growth and a strengthening currency. However, by 2019 — after a decade of economic stagnation and political disillusionment —emigration sentiment rose again to 15%.

Survey data from 2019 also reveal which sub-groups with the South African Jewish population are more likely to consider emigration:

  • Age (Figure 9): Almost a quarter of respondents aged 18–39 said they were likely to leave, compared with just 7% of those over 60.
  • Place of residence (Figure 10): Capetonians showed slightly lower levels of emigration sentiment than those living in Johannesburg and other smaller communities outside of the main centres.
  • Jewish identity (Figure 11): Those identifying as Orthodox showed a slightly higher emigration sentiment (18%) compared to those identifying as Traditional or Secular (13%).
  • Sense of belonging (Figure 12): Those who felt less connected to South Africa were more inclined to leave.
Figure 9. Emigration Sentiment by Age, (JCSSA 2019)
Figure 10. Emigration Sentiment by Place of Residence, (JCSSA 2019)
Figure 11. Emigration Sentiment by Jewish Identity Strand, (JCSSA 2019).
Figure 12. Emigration Sentiment by Sense of Belonging in South Africa, (JCSSA 2019) [17]

Interestingly, personal financial well-being did not show a strong association with the likelihood of emigration. Across income groups, attitudes were fairly similar. This suggests that broader economic concerns weigh more heavily than personal financial circumstances in shaping emigration decisions.

Reasons for Emigration

Figure 13 shows that over the past three decades, the motivations provided for emigration have shifted. In 1998, the dominant concern was personal safety, with nearly half of all respondents citing it as their main motive. In 2005 one observes the dominance of ‘pull’ rather than ‘push’ factors with the main reasons given for emigrating being family ties and career or study opportunities abroad. Safety concerns continue to play a role but have dropped significantly since 1998, and similarly with regards to ‘concerns about the future’, which dipped to a low of 6%.

Figure 13. Main motivations for wanting to leave South Africa. [18]

In 2019, two new trends emerged. In this period the most cited reason for wanting to emigrate was concern about the future of South Africa — named by 33% of respondents. Safety concerns still featured, but less than in the previous surveys. The second notable trend is that the motivation, ‘desire to live in Israel,’ increased significantly, from just 3–4% in earlier surveys to 15% in 2019. While a ‘trickle of the more ideologically motivated can be expected to occur all the time,’ one would have expected this proportion of the community to have remained fairly constant. The increased popularity of Israel, despite security concerns in Israel, indicates that a major change has taken place in the attitudes of many South African Jews.

The 2019 dataset further shows that motivations vary by age (Figure 14). Older respondents (60+) were more likely to be driven by pull factors- a wish to reunite with family or a desire to move to Israel, while younger people (18–39) were more likely to cite ‘push’ concerns about the country’s future and personal safety, as well as the pull factor of career and study opportunities.

Figure 14. Main motivations for wanting to leave South Africa by age, (JCSSA 2019)

While a person’s place of residence made only modest differences in motivations (Figure 15), those living in Johannesburg were slightly more likely than Capetonians to cite concern for the country’s future or personal safety as reasons, while people outside the main centres showed the strongest pull towards wanting to live in Israel as well as family reunion reasons.

Figure 15. Main Motivations for Wanting to Leave SA by Place of Residence (JCSSA 2019)

As in earlier sections, personal financial status was not a major discriminating factor in understanding differences in the reasons for emigration. Across all income groups, concern about the country’s direction was the most frequently cited basis for emigration (Figure 16). We note that wealthier individuals were more likely to list personal safety as a motivation as well as ‘career move/ study’ compared to those financially less well-off.

Figure 16. Main motivations for wanting to leave South Africa by financial well-being. (JCSSA 2019)

Jewish-Religious identity was found to be associated with a person’s primary motivation for emigration. Figure 17, mirroring Figure 7’s choice of destination counties, shows a clear pattern: the stronger someone’s Orthodox- religious Jewish identity, the more likely they are to say they’re leaving South Africa because they want to live in Israel. This is especially true for those in the Haredi subgroup, where 40% said moving to Israel was their main reason for emigrating. That share drops to 20% among Orthodox Jews, 6% among those who identify as Traditional, and just 3% among secular Jews. In comparison, Secular and Traditional Jews are more likely to say they’re leaving because they’re worried about South Africa’s future or about their personal safety.

The Progressive/Reform group does not fit this stepwise pattern. The Progressive sub-group shows a mix of similarities with other groups, like the Orthodox, many are drawn to Israel, while others, like the Secular, are motivated by concerns about safety and for a better lifestyle elsewhere.

Figure 17. Main motivations for wanting to leave SA by Jewish identity Strand (JCSSA 2019)

Given that emigration is almost always the result of multiple factors, the JCSSA survey also asked respondents to share their second and third most important reasons for considering emigration. While the overall picture remains the same, the combined responses highlight the important drivers of: concern regarding one’s children’s education, dissatisfaction with affirmative action policies, frustrations with poor municipal services and the pursuit of a better lifestyle.

While the survey data presented thus far has focused on attitudes towards emigration from respondents still living in South Africa, the 2017 Gen17 survey of Australian Jews provides insights from 838 South African-born Jews who now live in Australia. [19] Their reasons for leaving South Africa reflect the broader trends seen in the South African survey data. In the 1990s, the most common reasons for having emigrated were concerns about crime, social instability, the poor political situation and the implications for the future. From 2010 onward however, crime became a less of a factor and family-related reasons became increasingly important.

The Gen17 survey further asked Jewish South African expatriates why they chose Australia specifically as their destination. 40% said it was because of family connections; 34% cited a desire for a safe environment and a better future for their children while others cited Australia’s similarities to South Africa (11%). However, it is notable that only a small minority mentioned job opportunities or economic gain —3% listed employment as a factor, and only 1% believed they would be better off financially. These findings support what many in the community have long observed: South African Jewish emigration is rarely about financial advancement. Rather, it is about security, stability, and family ties — even when it means giving up material comfort or professional status.

The Last Five Years       

The world has not stood still since the most recent survey of the South African Jewish community was conducted in 2019. In the intervening years, a series of major global and domestic events have likely influenced migration decisions in various—and sometimes contradictory—ways. While it is difficult to determine their net effect, these events undoubtedly shaped how people evaluate their future in South Africa and abroad.

Globally, the COVID-19 pandemic (2020–2021) had a profound impact on international mobility. Lockdowns and travel bans made emigration practically difficult, and it is likely that many individuals postponed their plans due to the uncertainty. Yet once restrictions eased, emigration surged, particularly among those who had previously delayed their departure. This is evident in the South African aliyah numbers to Israel, which slumped in 2020 and then peaked in 2021.[20] At the same time, the rise of remote work has reshaped migration logic: as people were able to decouple their place of work from their place of residence, this opened new possibilities for both domestic and international migration.

Within South Africa, two key events appear especially salient. First, the July 2021 riots — included widespread looting, violence, and destruction mainly in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng. The riots intensified a sense of instability and weakened confidence in the state’s ability to provide security and probably pushed a lot of people one step closer to making the decision to emigrate.

In contrast, the 2024 national elections and the formation of a Government of National Unity were widely seen as a turning point. After years of ANC dominance, the emergence of a multi-party coalition signaled the resilience of South Africa’s democratic institutions and a renewed belief in the country’s future.

With regards to Israel, the shock and devastation of the 7 October 2023 attacks and outbreak of war would have been a significant consideration for anyone thinking about immigrating to the country. While The South African Jewish Report [21] has highlighted individuals who proceeded with their plans to move to Israel despite the conflict, for many others, the war led to hesitation, re-evaluation and delays. The Times of Israel, for example, reported a drop globally in immigration to Israel in 2024 compared to the previous year.[22]

Meanwhile, a rise in global antisemitism —from American college campuses to London to Sydney— may have reduced the appeal of the Western countries once thought to be ideal destinations. At the same time, antisemitism has also become more prevalent within South Africa. The ANC-led government’s decision to take Israel to the International Court of Justice, for example, has strained relations between the Jewish community and the state more than at any point since the advent of the democratic era. This shift has eroded the sense of security and belonging for many South African Jews. As shown in Figure 12 above, there is evidence that those who feel a weaker sense of belonging in the country are more likely to consider emigration.

In sum, the past few years have been marked by a range of global and domestic events that have undoubtedly shaped migration intentions in multiple, and at times conflicting, ways. Yet it remains difficult to assess their overall impact. Importantly, this is not the first period marked by volatility. South African Jews have long navigated a shifting landscape of uncertainty, regularly assessing their options.

Discussion and Conclusion

Migration is a complex issue, rarely driven by a single factor. Each individual’s decision to emigrate is shaped by a unique mix of personal circumstances and broader influences. Nonetheless, our analysis highlights key themes that have shaped South African Jewish emigration trends in the post-apartheid era.

Our study draws primarily on three high-quality, in-depth surveys of the South African Jewish community, each examining emigration intentions. This data enables us to trace changes over time in the overall likelihood of emigration, preferred destination countries, and the underlying motivations for leaving.

In the late 1990s, the dominant driver of emigration was crime. Over time however, this has been overtaken by a deeper concern about the country’s political and economic future. Emigration has become less about immediate safety or financial need and more about addressing long-term uncertainty. Unlike typical economic migrants who emigrate for better income and jobs abroad, most Jewish South Africans emigrants do not expect a better material life abroad. In fact, they often anticipate a drop in lifestyle standards. The motivation is for a more stable and predictable future.

The role of social and familial networks as a driver of emigration cannot be overstated, given that the majority of South African Jews have close relatives living abroad. These social connections both reduce the barriers to emigration and weaken the ties anchoring individuals to South Africa. As a result, even if concerns around safety and the economic-political environment were resolved, it is likely that network effects would continue to sustain emigration trends.

Historically, most South African Jewish emigrants settled in English-speaking Western democracies. However, one of the most notable shifts in the past two decades has been the rise of Israel as the primary destination. Israel’s growing appeal signals a significant change in how South African Jews view potential destination countries. While an emotional attachment to Israel and the attraction of Israel’s growing economy may play a role, practical factors are just as important: In a global context of increasingly restrictive immigration policies Israel offers admission to Jews through the country’s Law of Return, and a softer landing through financial benefits offered to new immigrants. For many, Israel now offers a compelling combination of ideological connection, social ties and practical accessibility.

Our analysis of subgroup dynamics found that, as is frequently observed, younger people are the most likely to emigrate from South Africa. Orthodox individuals are marginally more inclined to leave than those affiliated with other strands. Place of residence also appears to have some effect, with residents of Cape Town slightly less likely to emigrate compared to those living in other parts of the country.

Our findings reveal no significant link between an individual’s personal economic circumstances and their likelihood of emigration. Rather, it is the broader macroeconomic environment that plays a decisive role, with emigration sentiment rising and falling in response to South Africa’s political and economic climate. As we observe, during periods of economic growth, such as in 2005, the desire to emigrate declined substantially. This insight offers an alternative trajectory for the South African Jewish community: should the country achieve sustained economic growth and political stability, some of the main drivers of emigration would recede, paving the way for a more stable demographic future.

 

  • Reviva Hasson is a research fellow at the Isaac & Jessie Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies & research at the University of Cape Town. A more detailed and academic version of this research will be appearing later this year in the Journal Studies in Contemporary Jewry.

 

NOTES

[1] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024). International Migrant Stock 2024.https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock

[2] Colin Tatz, Peter Arnold, and Gillian Heller, Worlds Apart: The Re-Migration of South African Jews (Dural, NSW: 2007), 185.

[3] David Graham, “The Jews of South Africa in 2019,” 2020, 25, Available at www.kaplancentre.uct.ac.za

[4] Shirley Bruk, “The Jews of South Africa 2005 – Report on a Research Study,” 2006; Institute for Jewish Policy Research and The Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies, “Survey of Jewish South Africans 1998” (Cape Town: Kaplan Centre [producers],1999. DataFirst [Distributor],2021, 1998), https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.25828/W4Y8-W546; Barry Kosmin et al., “Jews of the New South Africa: Highlights of the 1998 National Survey of South African Jews,” 1999.

[5] Institute for Jewish Policy Research, Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies [producers], and DataFirst [distributor], “Jewish Community Survey of South Africa 2019 [Dataset],” 2020, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.25828/6C7F-1680.

[6] Country census and survey data rely on people self-selecting the Jewish option for the question on religion. This table excludes other countries, of which the largest is probably New Zealand (whose total Jewish population was enumerated as 5,274 in the 2018 Census).

[7] The number of Jewish U.S. residents born in South Africa is difficult to estimate given the small sample, less than 1%, of Sub-Saharan Africa-born Jews in the U.S. data. Pew Research Center, “Jewish Americans in 2020,” 8, 173. Based on JCSSA data, which shows that 21% of Jewish South African emigrants are in the USA, we infer a South African-born Jewish population in the United States is roughly 16,000.

[8] Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Census 2021,” 2021, online at: abs.gov.au/census; Office for National Statistics (ONS), “Census of England and Wales (Various), Table CT0265,” 2021, online at: ons.gov.uk; Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), “Statistical Abstract for Israel, Table 4.4” (Jerusalem: 2018) online at: https://www.cbs.gov.il/en/publications/Pages/2019/Statistical-Abstract-of-Israel-2019-No-70.aspx#; Brym, Neuman, and Lenton, “2018 Survey of Jews in Canada.”

[9] We note that the both the JCSSA survey and UN data are estimates and neither are able to capture the full picture. The survey data is limited by those who still have family living in South Africa, hence if everyone in the family has emigrated, they will not be included in the results. Administrative data on the other hand only reflects official data and is unlikely to reflect illegal migrants.

[10] Question (JCSSA, 2019): “In which country/countries does/do the members of your immediate family who USED TO LIVE in South Africa, CURRENTLY live? If there are more than four people in any category, please limit your answers to the ELDEST FOUR. An immediate family member is defined as a parent, sibling, child or grandchild.”

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024). International Migrant Stock 2024. https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock.

“Southern Africa” refers to countries that border South Africa: Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

[11] Sources: England and Wales: (Office for National Statistics (ONS), Census of England and Wales (Various), Table CT0265). The census recorded religion, country of birth, and year of arrival data, although only grouped totals were available and these have been averaged out in the table. Australia: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Census, 2006, 2011, 2016, 2021. The censuses record religion, country of birth, and year of arrival. Enumerated data were adjusted for undercount, given that the religion question is voluntary. Israel: CBS, Statistical Abstract for Israel, Table 4.4. The Israeli data record annual numbers of arrivals by country of origin (migrant flows).

[12] Question (2019): “Where would you move to in the next five years?” Question (1998/2005): “Which country would you most likely move to?”. This question was only asked to people who responded they were “very likely” or “quite likely” to emigrate from South Africa in the next five years (1998 [N= 267]; 2005 [N=69]; 2019 [N=555]). Sources: Bruk, The Jews of South Africa 2005, 88, 93 (includes 1998 data); Institute for Jewish Policy Research, Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies [producers], and DataFirst [distributor], “Jewish Community Survey of South Africa 2019 [Dataset],” 2020, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.25828/6C7F-1680.

[13] The percentage shown in parenthesis on the x-axis in these and forthcoming figures indicates the percentage of each subgroup within the South African Jewish population.

[14] “Other” includes all South Africans residing outside of the two main centres, mainly comprising Durban/Umhlanga, Gauteng Province (other than Johannesburg), and the Western Cape Province (other than Cape Town).

[15] Question (JCSSA, 2019): “How would you describe your current religious/Jewish identification? Please select one answer.” (Mixed religion (2 percent), not Jewish (1 percent) and other (1 percent) not shown).

[16] Question (JCSSA, 2019): “How likely are you to move from your current location in the next five years, including abroad?”  The responses show those that responded to this question as being “very likely” or “quite likely” with regards to moving to “a different country.” Question (1998 and 2005): “Thinking of the next five years, which of the alternatives comes closest to what applies to you?” (The options ranged from” ‘a different address but within 5km of my current location” to “a different country.”). (1998: [N=1000]; 2005 [N=1000]); 2019 [N=4193]). Names of South African presidents and the start of their terms are shown below the graph; *Kgalema Motlanthe served as president from September 2018 to May 2019. Key economic events are noted at the bottom of the figure.

Sources: Macrotrends, “South Africa GDP Growth Rate 1961–2023,” online at: www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/ZAF/south-africa/gdp-gross-domestic-product  (accessed 27 February 2024); Graham, “The Jews of South Africa in 2019”; Bruk, The Jews of South Africa 2005 (includes 1998 data).

[17] Question (JCSSA, 2019): “To what extent do you have a sense of belonging in South Africa? Please select one answer.”

[18] Question (2019): “Why would you consider leaving South Africa?” Question (1998/2005): “You say that you are likely to leave South Africa to live in another country during the next five years. What would you say are your three most important reasons for leaving?”

This question was only asked to people who responded they were “very likely” or “quite likely” to emigrate from South Africa in the next five years (1998 [N= 267]; 2005 [N=69]; 2019 [N=555]).

Sources: Bruk, The Jews of South Africa 2005, 105 (includes 1998 data); Institute for Jewish Policy Research, Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies [producers], and DataFirst [distributor], “Jewish Community Survey of South Africa 2019 [Dataset],” 2020, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.25828/6C7F-1680.

[19] We gratefully acknowledge JCA in Sydney and the Australian Centre for Jewish Civilization at Monash University in Melbourne for access to the Gen17 data

[20] Pers com with the Jewish Agency and Israel Centre, May 2024

[21] See some examples in the SAJR:  Tankle (22.08.2024) ‘SA aliya to Israel not slowing’, Tankle (6.03.2025) ‘Aliya increases, with most olim under 40’ and Tankle (05.09.2024) ‘Wartime Israel doesn’t deter thousands of olim’

[22] ‘Immigration to Israel down 24% since last Independence Day’ The Times of Israel (28.04.2025)