(Author: Dr. Azila Talit Reisenberger, Vol. 65, No. 2, Rosh Hashanah 2010)
In his article ‘What’s God got to do with it? Atheism and Religious Practice’, published in the journal Ratio, XIX, December 2006, the philosopher Professor David Benatar argues that the conventional wisdom that an atheist individual who follows religious practise is an incoherent notion; and further, that the assumption that the abandonment of God implies the abandonment of religious practice, and vice versa, is an incorrect one. This short response is a special note taking this notion a step further; I further propose that atheists are more ready to recite prayers in contradiction to their true belief, when the prayers are not in their first language.
Benatar proposes that “theistic departure from religious observance and atheistic adherence to religious practice are coherent” (2006: 383). He recognises that “it is commonly thought that belief in God, coupled with a belief in the divine authorship of the Bible…entails orthopraxy – adherence to the full range of normative religious practice” (384). The consequence of this, he notes, is that it is thought that atheism “entails the opposite – namely complete abandonment of all (non-moral) religious practises” (ibid.).
Benatar then goes on to argue that “belief in God…need not entail orthopraxy…[n]or need atheism entail either the abandonment of all religious practice” (385). In examining Judaism as an example, he shows that “theists are not logically committed to orthopraxy” (388). He does this by showing that there is an acceptance that Jewish laws have and can change, i.e. one can “reform a scripture that one believes is authorised by God” (ibid.). Therefore, Jewish theism does not necessarily entail adherence to certain Jewish religious practices, which may change over time.
As a corollary, Benatar argues that “atheists can engage, without contradiction, in orthopraxy” (389). He states that there may be “non-theistic reasons for observing religious practices”, for example its sentimental or family value (390). Furthermore, “religious practice can be both an expression of and a means of fostering an (ethnic) identity” (ibid.).
This last reason is an important one, and Benatar focuses on it (although acknowledges it as an exemplar rather than the only reason).
It is clear that across the religion spectrum, there are many adherents who follow certain religious practices without a belief in their respective Divinity. The degree of adherence to religious practices varies; however, it is clear that many people perform the fundamental prayers of ‘al-Akbar’ (Islam) or the Shema (Judaism) without holding a sincere belief in God.
I suggest that this seemingly illogical phenomenon that Benatar mentions occurs in religions that employ ‘foreign’ language for worship.1 I further propose that atheists are more ready to recite prayers in contradiction to their true belief, when the prayers are not in their first language.
I concur with Benatar that the recitation of prayers is a religious practice that may serve the purpose of ethnic identity, and so are recited by atheists for a reason other than the “prayer-value” of the act. I maintain that the act of the recitation is the meaningful aspect for the atheist, and not the prayer and belief in God it usually implies.
However, when the prayer is translated into English (or any other first language) the focus shifts from the act and form of the recitation, to the substance of the prayer. In instances where atheists who follow certain religious practices, such as that of communal prayer, are asked to recite a particular prayer in their native language, it is more difficult for them to do so, especially when confronted by prayers which are in contradiction with their convictions.
An example of this was evidenced in my own Progressive Jewish Congregation in East London, South Africa. This congregation is comprised primarily of secular Jews who follow the religious practice of communal prayer for the reasons of ethnic identity and community. Prayers by the congregants are usually recited in Hebrew, a language foreign to almost all of the participants. The fact that they recite the Hebrew prayer without questioning its exact meaning can be seen clearly from the fact that even the most gender-sensitive person chants without hesitation the Amidah, a prayer with a strong patriarchal slant, as long as it is in Hebrew. When it is read in English, they immediately adjust the wording by turning it into a genderless utterance.
An even more unequivocal example was evident during the Passover ritual dinner, the Seder. The Hebrew words: “shfoch hamatcha al ha’goyim” was recited like a chant, but when people were asked to recite the prayers in English, and they faced with a the request from God to… ‘pour your wrath upon the gentiles’, it was simply too much of an affront to their true beliefs, hence they “passed-over” and circumvented the paragraph.
The desire for ethnic or community identification is strong enough to make people follow religious practice that may be in contradiction with their belief or non-belief in God, as long as it is ‘easy’ for them to do so – by the recitation of foreign words they do not exactly understand nor carefully analyse. However, when people see certain prayers in their own language and understand the exact meaning of it, they refuse to do this.
It is evident that prayer in a foreign tongue is a more reflexive recitation than reflective pronouncement. The sound of the words are carried out as a chant rather than declared with meaning. Therefore, some atheists pray to God, and well-tempered and reasonable people are able to recite often offensive or extremist prayers and set declarations without fully realising the substance or implication of their words.
I maintain that if religious people who recite prayers in foreign languages fully understood the nuances of what they were saying, they would be more hesitant in proclaiming a willingness to kill or die for their religions. The promotion of such proclamations would diminish if individuals knew what they were being encouraged to say. Such extremist proclamations often incite extremist actions or reactions, which may not be fully intended by the individual – who simply repeat set-utterances in unfamiliar languages.
I suggest that a study should be carried out to evaluate how strong the correlation is between offensive prayer and the condoning of such notions when disseminated in a foreign language to the speaker. An understanding of this will assist us in attempting to curb religious extremists – if we let people translate and know exactly the wording of their prayers and what they are saying, they might not rush to profess that they will kill/die for their religions.
Dr Azila Talit Reisenberger is a Senior Lecturer in Hebrew and Jewish Studies in the School of Languages and Literature, University of Cape Town. Her poetry and short stories have been widely published in South Africa, Israel, the USA, UK and Germany. She is a regular contributor to Jewish Affairs.
NOTES
- I believe also that it occurs more often in prescriptive religious traditions. This is because prescriptive traditions dictate the ways in which adherents conduct their lives: what they eat, how they dress, the social order including the intimate relationship in the family, etc. As being considered part of the particular tradition, one has to follow an extensive web of commandments. It can happen that the philosophical question of the existence of the Divine is but one detail. If the majority of the commandments are acceptable to the person, he or she is prepared to recite the prayers or declaration of belief in God. However, this is another issue, outside of the scope of this discussion.
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