(Author: Cecil Bloom, Vol. 73, No. 2, Rosh Hashanah 2018)
“My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I should like to say, before I say another word, that the reason I am interested in this movement is that I met one some two years ago who is now upon this platform, and who has opened my eyes as to what this movement meant. He is on the list of speakers; you will hear him presently; his name is known to most in the records of Zionism: I mean Dr Gaster”.
Thus spoke Sir Mark Sykes when addressing the audience at an event celebrating the issue of the Balfour Declaration, held at the London Opera House on 2 December 1917.1 Sykes’ comments, together with his son Christopher’s later writing how he believed that Moses Gaster opened his father’s eyes to the meaning of Zionism in the last days of 1915,2 have resulted in some writers suggesting that Gaster was the prime motivator in getting the British government to formulate a policy that led to the Balfour Declaration. But is this a correct assessment of history?
Moses Gaster (1856-1939) was born in Bucharest, Romania. After being ordained as a rabbi in 1881, he became a teacher at the University of Bucharest. He gained an international reputation as a Master of Romance Philology, being considered to be the greatest Romanian philologist of his time, and he also made many great contributions to the cause of rabbinic learning.3 After his expulsion from Romania because of his support for pro-Jewish protests, he immigrated to England. There he taught Slavonic literature at Oxford University until, in 1887, he was appointed Haham (Chief Rabbi) of the Sephardic community, an appointment he retained until his resignation following disagreements with his congregation in 1918. Active in Hibbat Zion and then in the international Zionist movement, Gaster became one of Herzl’s early supporters at a time when Herzl was not welcomed by some Zionist Federation in 1907, the year he visited Palestine.6
Despite his eminence, Gaster was never popular due to his attitude of superiority towards many of his contemporaries, something that eventually diminished his importance to the Zionist movement. He was often at odds with other Zionist leaders in Britain and made many enemies. In his renowned book The Balfour Declaration, Leonard Stein wrote that there was no doubt about Gaster’s eminence as an outstanding figure in the Zionist movement. His powerful personality, imposing presence and gifts of oratory made him an important figure.7 However, as Stein sees it, he was kept out of the mainstream by an autocratic temperament that made him a difficult colleague.8 Weizmann once described him as a good Zionist but one who suffered from jealousy. In his view, Gaster considered himself more fitting than even Herzl for the position of President of the Zionist Organisation.9 Weizmann was further of the opinion that Gaster’s view was tainted by an ingrained personal opposition to Herzl.10 There were some, apparently, who wanted Gaster to succeed Herzl on the latter’s death in 1904.11[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row] Rabbi Moses Gaster, when he was Haham (Chief Rabbi) of the Sephardic, or Spanish and Portuguese Congregation in London As for Herzl, his early comments on Gaster were favourable but later he changed his view. After addressing an audience in London during his first visit there in 1896, he wrote in his diary that Gaster, as chairman, made ‘a fiery speech’12 and, at the first Zionist Congress in 1897, he told delegates that he had received several letters and telegrams but specifically referred only to the one sent by Gaster, who wrote to express his sympathy with the objects of the Congress.13 But subsequently, there are several indications in his diary that his opinion had changed. In March 1899 he sent Gaster a telegram “in which I gave him a piece of my mind”14 and in April 1900 he wrote that Gaster came to his London hotel and “welcomed me with a bitter-sweet expression with forced enthusiasm”.15 In June 1901 Gaster was said to be “loyal to my empire again”.16 The veteran English Zionist Harry Sacher, a close friend of Weizmann, wrote that at an English Zionist Federation conference, Gaster declared, “I am the greatest Jew of the century”. In Gaster’s defence, Sacher added that this was wrung from him by a private but audible gibe but he believed that it did represent Gaster’s own deep conviction and which left no-one in doubt as to the value he set upon himself.17 It was Sacher’s opinion that although he was seen as one of the great figures at any Congress, Gaster contributed nothing of enduring value to Zionist thought and literature.18 One of the great American Zionists, Louis Lipsky, supports Sacher’s views. He perceived Gaster as being filled with the vanity that afflicted all great orators and, as a proud, egotistical man he never had many devoted followers or disciples for long. Weizmann’s view of Gaster also changed over time. There must have been a strong bond of friendship early on because Gaster was sandak at the circumcision of Weizmann’s second son.19 In 1904, writing to Menahem Ussishkin, Weizmann commented that Gaster was more intelligent than the other Zionist leaders and above petty political intrigue. A year later he told Gaster that he was the only man to whom he could turn to “in frankness and friendship”. However, by 1913 Weizmann was writing that Gaster was “seeing ghosts” and probably harbouring ambitious plans; he questioned whether it was worthwhile to attempt to elevate him to the Zionist leadership.20 His reservations hardened as the Zionists got closer to achieving their principal objective with regard to Eretz Israel. In a letter to Gaster on 5 February 1915, he complained at the manner at which he had been criticised by him, saying further that he desired harmony and confidence in his colleagues and was clearly under strain. In actual fact, he threatened to drop out because he did not wish to entangle himself in any quarrels.21 In a letter dated 8 February 1915, he again showed his displeasure with Gaster, who clearly had needled him by complaining that Weizmann had been twice in London without seeing him.22 There is no doubt that Gaster was a very difficult person to work with. He frequently accused others of tricking and betraying him and never admitted that he was ever in the wrong. Other Zionist leaders, especially Jewish Chronicle editor Leopold Greenberg and Joseph Cowan, complained that Gaster was unique in finding compromise difficult to accept. He quarrelled with all his colleagues from time to time (“there appears to have been virtually no-one with whom the learned Haham did not quarrel eventually”)23 and the eventual elimination of his influence in the Zionist movement resulted from the successful efforts of his old colleagues to dismiss him from any leadership role. Gaster was one of those responsible for Zionism becoming an important part of Anglo-Jewish politics,24 but eventually he transformed himself from being a widely respected influential and politically aware leader into a peripheral figure.25 The breakthrough in Zionist dealings with the British government occurred when Gaster became involved with Sir Mark Sykes soon after Lloyd George became Prime Minister at the end of 1916. Sykes had been appointed to the War Cabinet Secretariat as an Assistant Secretary with special responsibility for British policy towards Palestine.26 Prior to this, in March 1915, Herbert Samuel gave him a copy of a memorandum that he had put before the Cabinet on support for Zionist aims in Palestine. This document impressed Sykes. In March 1916, Sykes visited Moscow with Francois Georges-Picot to negotiate the final stages of the Sykes-Picot agreement. The visit showed him that Zionism was an important element in Jewish life in Russia. He even discussed with the Russian Foreign Minister the possibility that Zionism could solve the Jewish problem.27 On his return from Moscow he asked Samuel to put him in touch with a Zionist leader with whom he could hold discussions. Samuel recommended Gaster, who had advised him on his memorandum. Samuel was said to admire Gaster as a man with adroit political sensibilities. He considered him, rather than Nahum Sokolow or Chaim Weizmann, as the man most suitable to meet Sykes.28 It is likely that Sykes and Gaster already knew each other. Sykes’ son, Christopher, has written that they probably came to know each other as members of learned Oriental societies to which they both belonged.29 Curiously, in The Balfour Declaration in which he speculates at length on why Samuel chose Gaster and not Weizmann or Sokolow to speak to Sykes, Leonard Stein adds a note that Samuel once told him (Stein) that he had no recollection of his suggesting Gaster and not the other two men.30 Sykes first met Gaster on 2 May 191631 and early on clearly had a favourable impression of his value to him. For example, he arranged for Gaster’s correspondence to be exempt from censorship and entrusted him with highly confidential and delicate matters.32 He further introduced him to Picot. Sykes originally had great difficulty in persuading Picot to recognise the importance of Zionism, but Gaster understood and played upon the key issue that could be used to advance the Zionist cause with both men.33 At his first meeting with Sykes, Gaster advised that Jewish opinion in the United States could be won over by a fait accompli with British soldiers occupying Jerusalem and then, in talks with Picot, he emphasised the importance of bargaining for Zionism and world Jewish opinion by showing how Jewish influence could be tied to the Allied cause.34 His contacts with Sykes lessened after July 1916, however, in line with Foreign Office policy.35 The Foreign Office decided to step back from its discussions over Zionism in the context of French opposition to a suggested pro-Zionist statement regarding Palestine’s future. But Sykes, still anxious to pursue a pro-Zionist policy, then met James Malcolm, an Armenian representative, who advised him to use Weizmann and Sokolow as the Zionist representatives in any negotiations. Sykes met them both and liked them and they became significantly involved. Sykes began to have reservations about Gaster when the latter suggested that Germany and not France might be preferred as a partner in a condominium in Palestine. Gaster’s contacts with Sykes certainly lessened from July 1916 onwards.36 Sykes’ attitude towards Zionism was further reinforced after meeting Aaron Aaronsohn, leader of the NILI espionage group that provided key intelligence data to Allenby in Palestine. Much impressed by Aaronsohn’s attitude and objectives, he confided in him his view that Gaster had assumed “pontifical airs” and had tried to assure him he was able to make the whole of Zionism work. Sykes thus believed Gaster at first but finally realised he had been mistaken and that the latter’s egotism was ruining him.37 Furthermore, Sykes was disturbed by Gaster’s saying that he did not trust Aaronsohn, as he was an “ambitious man”.38 This did not fit in with Sykes’ assessment. As it happened, Gaster’s contacts with Sykes were not that well-known by other Zionists. Weizmann apparently only heard of his meetings with Sykes at the end of January 1917, although Sokolow had been aware of them soon after they took place.39 Despite reservations regarding Gaster’s involvement, Sokolow joined a committee, comprising Weizmann, Herbert Bentwich, Joseph Cowen and himself, formed to sketch out a programme for Zionism and to serve as a foundation for the official representations contemplated.40 By now, Gaster was being strongly criticised as a dictatorial man who was peripheral to the Zionist leadership. Sokolow became the recognised leader of the World Zionist Organisation and was chosen to have further regular consultations with Sykes and Picot.41 Gaster found himself side-lined by Weizmann, Sokolow and by his especially bitter enemy Leopold Greenberg. Sykes then contacted Sokolow and Weizmann on how to pursue the Zionist question and entered into a close relationship with them from the beginning of 1917. He suggested the key meeting that was held on 7 February. Not wanting to offend Gaster, he proposed it be held at Gaster’s home, with Sykes attending in a private capacity and not in any official role. Lord Rothschild, Bentwich, Cowen, James de Rothschild, Sacher, Samuel, Weizmann and Sokolow were also present. Gaster was allowed to preside,42 but Sokolow was in control of the meeting.43 Interestingly, Samuel makes no mention whatsoever of Gaster in his autobiography, Memories; of this key meeting he wrote, “I remember being present at a conference [sic] in February 1917 between Sykes and the Zionists”.44 At the meeting, Sokolow was chosen as the person to have further regular consultations with Sykes and Picot and, because all the Entente powers were now seeing the Zionist question as an important one, he was called to Paris in March to outline the principles of the Zionist programme to the French.45 Not surprisingly, Gaster was furious at the way he had been out-manoeuvred and sidelined, later referring to his displacement as a coup d’etat46 (although he comments in his diary, “The most important meeting ever held concerning Zionism was held here under my chairmanship”).47 Gaster was resentful because he claimed to have been superseded by Sokolow after carrying out discussions with Sykes for nearly a year. Weizmann’s reply to this was that Gaster had not conducted the negotiations for almost a year prior to the meeting in his home,48 and reminded him that he, Weizmann, had proposed before that meeting that Sokolow be chosen to negotiate with Sykes et al.49 In a letter to James de Rothschild, who had suggested Sokolow because he had the advantage of being a Russian and a layman, Gaster said he “hotly resented” the choice of Sokolow.50 He later wrote that he saw the Balfour Declaration as being a deliberately vague and tenuous document issued to justify the British occupation of Palestine and gain Jewish support for the war while constituting no tangible achievements of the goals of the Zionist organisation or the realisation of the Basle programme. He bitterly observed that “it was now time for Jews to crawl on their bellies and express unbounded gratitude”51 (although he did, however, speak favourably about the Balfour Declaration at the celebratory meeting at the London Opera House in December 1917). In 1920, he tried to form a rival organisation.52 Notwithstanding the way in which Gaster became perceived by British Zionists, he was very well thought of in the United States. In 1916, Stephen Wise thought he had the stature to enable him to persuade American Jewry to support the Allies in the war, be acceptable to the Yiddish masses and be able to talk to Wall Street. On Gaster’s retirement as Haham in 1918 following tensions with his congregation, the American Jewish Chronicle in 1918 described him as an “international figure of high regard”.53 How sincere were Sykes’ comments about Gaster? Christopher Sykes believed that Gaster opened his father’s eyes to the meaning of Zionism in the last days of 1915,54 but this does not mean that he considered Gaster to be pre-eminent in the discussions and negotiations that later took place. Gaster played a part in Sykes’ conversion to Zionism but Sykes was sharp enough to realise that others, such as Sokolow and Weizmann, had more to offer. It is clear that the publication of the Balfour Declaration, in which Sykes played a key role, did not result from any special involvement on Gaster’s part. It is, however, worth noting that Herbert Bentwich sent Gaster a letter of congratulation ten days after the Balfour Declaration was published.55 He, at least, appreciated Gaster’s contribution despite the differences between him and other Zionist leaders. Cecil Bloom, a veteran contributor to Jewish Affairs, is a former technical director of a multinational pharmaceutical firm in the UK. His essays on Jewish themes relating to music, literature, history and Bible have also appeared in Midstream and Jewish Quarterly. 
NOTES
